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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, advances in big data, machine learning,1 and 
intellectual property field.2 One question that has attracted growing attention 
concerns whether algorithms3 can be better deployed to promote fair use in 
copyright law. The debate on the feasibility of developing automated fair use 
systems is not new; it can be traced back to more than a decade ago.4 
Nevertheless, recent technological advances have invited policymakers and 
commentators to revisit this earlier debate. 
As 
 
1  See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing an accessible overview of 
machine learning for lawyers). 
2  An obvious question in the copyright area concerns whether creative works generated by 
intelligent machines are eligible for copyright protection. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Coding 
Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2012); 
Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395 (2016); 
Daniel J. Gervais, The Machine as Author, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 343 (2019); James Grimmelmann, 
There s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work And It s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 403 (2016) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, There s No Such Thing]; Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & 
Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. REV. 813, 836 47 (2018); Carys J. Craig & Ian 
R. Kerr, The Death of the AI Author (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374951. For a provocative discussion of the role of robots in copyright s 
cosmology, see generally James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657 
(2016). For earlier discussions of copyright issues involving computer-generated works, see generally 
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True 
Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042 72 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-
Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986). 
3  As the U.S. Public Policy Council of the Association for Computing Machinery explained: 
An algorithm is a self-contained step-by-step set of operations that computers and other smart  
devices carry out to perform calculation, data processing, and automated reasoning tasks. 
Increasingly, algorithms implement institutional decision-making based on analytics, which 
involves the discovery, interpretation, and communication of meaningful patterns in data. Especially 
valuable in areas rich with recorded information, analytics relies on the simultaneous application of 
statistics, computer programming, and operations research to quantify performance. 
U.S. ASS N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY: STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-
policy/2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf [hereinafter ACM Statement]. 
4  For earlier discussions in this area, see generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights 
Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. 
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 53 (2001); 
Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U.L. REV. 13, 63 73 (2006). 
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whether algorithms can be better deployed to promote fair use in copyright 
law. Part II explains why policymakers and commentators have remained 
skeptical about such deployment. Part III builds the case for greater 
algorithmic deployment to promote fair use. Part IV concludes by identifying 
areas to which policymakers and commentators should pay greater attention 
if automated fair use systems are to be developed. Although this Article 
draws heavily on U.S. copyright law due in part to the location of this 
symposium and in part to the active transplant of the U.S. fair use model 
abroad5 le to all jurisdictions that 
have embraced fair use, fair dealing, or hybrid models.6 
II.     SKEPTICISM TOWARD AUTOMATION 
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have advanced three major 
arguments explaining why algorithms cannot be satisfactorily deployed to 
promote fair use in copyright law. This Part outlines each argument in turn. 
A.     Backward State of Technology 
The first major argument against the satisfactory deployment of 
algorithms to promote fair use concerns our relatively backward state of 
use is one of the starkest examples of the mismatch between what the law 
requires and what technology can do. Accurate, technological enforcement 
of the law of fair use is far beyond t
 
5  See Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 129
37 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution] (documenting a growing trend toward the 
worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair use model and a slowly emerging paradigm shift in international 
copyright norms); see also Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS 1, 3 10 (2018) 
(discussing the efforts to transplant fair use across the world and the eight different modalities of 
transplantation that the transplanting jurisdictions have employed). See generally JONATHAN BAND & 
JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333863 
(listing the fair use or fair dealing provisions from around the world). 
6  I noted earlier the distinction between fair use and fair dealing as follows: 
Like fair use, . . . fair dealing allows for an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work. Unlike fair use, 
however, it promotes a closed system of copyright limitations and exceptions. Each fair dealing 
provision is drafted with a specific purpose, or a set of related purposes. Unless the user s conduct 
falls within a specified purpose, the use will not be permissible under copyright law. 
Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 5, at 126; see also Peter K. Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly 
Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT L L. REV. 283, 327 (2016) ( [A] better way to distinguish 
between fair dealing and fair use is to describe the former as a closed-ended, purpose-based regime and 
the latter as an open-ended, flexible regime. ). 
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7 Because the current state of technology does not allow us 
8 it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
satisfactorily deploy algorithms to make automated fair use determinations 
on a case-by-case basis. 
A key part of this technological challenge involves the significant 
difference between the approaches taken by judges to determine whether 
copyright law permits a specific use of a copyrighted work and those taken 
by computer programmers. Under the current copyright system, courts 
refrain from making ex ante determinations on what uses would be 
considered fair.9 I
conflicts arise and the cases go to courts, judges will make determinations 
after the fact.10 By contrast, computer programmers need to know in advance 
what legal rules and outcomes should be built into automated systems. While 
they will try their best to translate those rules and outcomes into code and 
algorithms, they will have considerable difficulty determining ex ante how 
judges will rule in new situations.11 Inevitably, such translation will also 
 
 7  Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57, 59; 
see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 192 (2019) ( Automated processes have obvious efficiency advantages, but 
such processes may not align well (or at all) with applicable legal requirements that are couched in shades 
of gray. ); Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 56 ( At least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights 
management code that approximates both the individual results of judicial determinations and the overall 
dynamism of fair use jurisprudence. ); Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at 
Copyright s Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 31 (2002) ( [T]he technologies employed by [digital rights 
management systems] are not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright because 
[technological protection measures] themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing 
and non-infringing uses of digital works. ); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110 11 (2007) ( Image-parsing software may someday be able to 
identify pictures or videos that are similar to individual copyrighted works, but they will never be able to 
determine whether those pictures are fair uses, or whether they are legitimate copies or displays made 
under one of the many statutory exceptions . . . ). 
8  See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 ( A [digital rights management system] that gets all fair use 
judgments right would in effect be a judge on a chip  predicting with high accuracy how a real judge 
would decide a lawsuit challenging a particular use. Clearly, this is infeasible with today s technology. ); 
see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 59 ( At present, only human intelligence, reviewing the unique 
circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair. ). 
9  See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 288 (2019) ( [F]air use carries 
with it the disadvantage of ex ante uncertainty; no one can be entirely certain in advance how a court will 
weigh the four factors, and hence there is always some apprehension that a use may be found infringing 
rather than fair. ); Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 61 ( Under the current conception of fair use, the 
decision whether or not to use a work is made ex ante by the user if an infringement suit is brought later, 
the court may or may not validate the user s calculus, but penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has 
been undertaken. ). 
 10 See John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-Based 
Fair Use Enforcement, 92 PROC. IEEE 985, 992 (2004) ( In the area of copyright law, the evolution of 
the doctrine of fair use  is tightly bound to the practice of after-the-fact adjudication. ). 
11 As Dan Burk and Julie Cohen observed: 
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understanding and interpretation of the law.12 
To be sure, the past decade has seen significant advances in big data, 
machine learning, and artificial intelligence. One may recall media reports 
about how IBM Watson prevailed over noted human champions in the quiz 
show Jeopardy!13 
14 As amazing 
as these technological advances have been, they do not automatically 
translate into automated fair use determinations. Just because Watson has 
performed well in Jeopardy! does not mean that it can perform equally well 
as a fair use judge. While transferred learning has become increasingly 
popular,15 
16 there is no evidence 
that Watson or AlphaGo can successfully transfer its learning from Jeopardy! 
or Go to intellectual property law.17 
 
We are not optimistic that system designers will be able to anticipate the range of access privileges 
that may be appropriate for fair uses to be made of a particular work. Neither are we optimistic that 
system designers will be able to anticipate the types of uses that would be considered fair by a court. 
Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 55. 
12 See Lisa A. Shay et al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in ROBOT LAW 235, 257 
(Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) ( [T]hose who specify and implement the code base of a system will likely 
make their own interpretations of legal and illegal behavior, perhaps without any legal training. ); Maayan 
Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. 
L. REV. 181, 189 (2017) ( [T]ranslating legal mandates into code inevitably embodies particular choices 
as to how the law is interpreted, which may be affected by a variety of extrajudicial considerations, 
including the conscious and unconscious professional assumptions of program developers, as well as 
various private business incentives. ). See generally Lisa A. Shay et al., Do Robots Dream of Electric 
Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, in ROBOT LAW, supra, at 274 (providing an interesting 
study documenting the variances in an empirical experiment in which three teams of computer 
programmers were asked to translate a subset of the New York State traffic law into computer code for 
the purposes of determining traffic violations based on real-world driving data). 
13 John Markoff, Computer Wins on Jeopardy! : Trivial, It s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at 
A1. 
14 See Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Machine Masters Man in Complex Game of Go, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2016, at A1 (reporting AlphaGo s victory over eighteen-time world Go champion Lee 
Sedol); Paul Mozur, In Win for A.I., Google Program Humbles Master of a Mind-Boggling Game, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2017, at B3 (reporting AlphaGo s victory over Ke Jie, the world s then best Go player). 
15 For overviews of transfer learning  in the deep learning context, see generally JOHN D. 
KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 236 37 (2019); Jason Brownlee, A Gentle Introduction to Transfer Learning 
for Deep Learning, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://machinelearningmastery.com/transfer-learning-for-deep-learning/. 
16 KELLEHER, supra note 15, at 236. 
17 See Woodrow Barfield, Towards a Law of Artificial Intelligence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2, 9 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) ( [W]hile 
impressive examples of skilled behavior, [IBM, AlphaGo, and other similar victories] are examples of 
artificial intelligence performing in a narrow domain of expertise; at this time more human-like artificial 
intelligence remains elusive. ). Healthcare is one area in which Watson has not been very successful, 
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B.     Changes in Creative Choices and Practices 
The second major argument against the satisfactory deployment of 
algorithms to promote fair use relates to behavioral changes such deployment 
will generate. In a recent article, Dan Burk expressed fear that algorithmic 
fair use would create considerable biases, which in turn would affect 
authorial choices.18 
automated systems become embedded in public behavior and consciousness. 
Thus, algorithmic fair use carries with it the very real possibility of 
habituating new media participants to its own biases and so progressively 
19 
. After all, we have 
already seen significant behavioral changes following the active deployment 
of algorithms in technology platforms to facilitate copyright enforcement,20 
II.B will 
further discuss).21 To avoid automatic detection, users have changed the type 
of content they upload to these platforms.22 Outside the intellectual property 
context, we have seen Facebook users modifying behavior to manipulate or 
23 By including hashtags, metadata, or 
 
despite IBM s high ambition. See ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN 
MAKE HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN 55 (2019) ( IBM Watson s experience with MD Anderson, one of 
the country s leading cancer centers, was a debacle noteworthy for many missteps. ); Steve Lohr, 
Fulfilling Watson s Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, at B1 (noting Watson s failure to perform well 
in the healthcare area). 
18 Burk, supra note 9. 
19 Id. at 285. 
 20 For discussions of algorithmic copyright enforcement, see generally Maayan Perel & Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016) 
[hereinafter Perel & Elkin-Koren, Accountability]; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12. 
21 See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (providing an 
 
& Elkin-Koren, Accountability, supra note 20, at 509 16; Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the 
Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543 60 (2017). 
22 See Tony Zhou, Postmortem: Every Frame a Painting, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@tonyszhou/postmortem-1b338537fabc, quoted in Burk, supra note 9, at 303 
-
and-
[they] chose, the way narration and clip audio weave together, the reordering and flipping of shots, the 
 
23 See Caleb Garling, , THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801/ 
(discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the author s post); Anjana Susarla, The New 
Digital Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms and People Who Don t, THE 
CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019), https://theconversation.com/the-new-digital-divide-is-between-people-
who-opt-out-of-algorithms-and-people-who-dont-114719 ( A study of Facebook usage found that when 
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typos, Internet and social media users have also redesigned their expressions 
to enhance or evade algorithm-driven recognition.24 As if these examples 
were not enough, an entire industry has been created to help businesses and 
25 Thus, if algorithms are deployed to a 
greater extent to make automated fair use determinations, it will be no 
surprise to find authors altering their creative choices and practices. 
C.     Technological Shortcomings 
The final major argument against the satisfactory deployment of 
algorithms to promote fair use pertains to the biases, bugs, and other 
documented problems now found in automated systems.26 For instance, 
ProPublica published an exposé on the racial biases found in COMPAS, the 
scoring software used by law enforcement and correction personnel to 
determine risks of recidivism.27 
 
participants were made aware of Facebook s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants 
modified their behavior to try to take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased their usage 
of Facebook. ); see also Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
12 14 (2018) (listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and obfuscation among the dominant 
gaming strategies deployed by users on Internet platforms). 
24 As Tarleton Gillespie observed: 
When we use hashtags in our tweets a user innovation that was embraced later by Twitter we are 
not just joining a conversation or hoping to be read by others, we are redesigning our expression so 
noticed by the algorithm: teens have been known to tag their status updates with unrelated brand 
work to evade an algorithm: Napster and P2P users sharing infringing copyrighted music were 
record industry software would not. 
Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON 
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 184 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (footnote 
omitted); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 52 CORNELL INT L L.J. 
(forthcoming 2020) (noting the research from the University of Washington that shows how platform 
users have s -driven anti-trolling system by using misspellings such as 
. 
25 See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 23
 for the 
searc  
 26 See ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING 
OUR DIGITAL FUTURE Burk, supra note 
9
potential pitfalls in reliance on algorithmic regulation); Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide and Equality 
in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing algorithmic biases). 
27 Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. 
Id. 
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defendants were far more likely than white defendants to be incorrectly 
judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, while white defendants were more 
28 In 
Tay had quickly become sexist and racis  . . had [the 
29 
Another report showed that Hewlett-
on [its] new . . . computers did not track the faces of Black people in some 
30 
While many of these problems were the result of improperly designed 
algorithms, properly designed algorithms will face similar problems if they 
fail to obtain appropriate training data. In computer science jargon, such 
that is, the computer 
will produce faulty outcomes when the inputted data were inaccurate, biased, 
or otherwise inappropriate.31 In the copyright context, for example, 
algorithms that are trained on data involving parodied entertainment will 
likely provide very different outcomes from those that are trained on data 
involving textbooks and other educational materials. How well automated 
fair use systems perform will therefore depend on how well the input data 
correspond to court decisions and day-to-day fair use practices. 
More problematic, because algorithmic outcomes are often fed back into 
the algorithms as training data, the utilization of machine learning will create 
self-reinforced feedback loops that amplify the biases found in the initial 
 
28 Id. 
29 Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age 13, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-
algorithm-age. 
 30 Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical Harm in the 
Basic Components of Software, 10 INT L J. COMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations omitted). 
 31 See Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 5, at 157 (defining garbage in, garbage out  
situation as one in which incorrect input ends up producing faulty output ). This age-old problem can be 
traced back to the early days of computing. See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix 
Artificial Intelligence s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 585 n.25 (2018) (noting that 
Charles Babbage, whom many refer to as the father of computer,  was asked whether the right answers 
would have come out if the wrong figures had been put into the machine (citing CHARLES BABBAGE, 
PASSAGES FROM THE LIFE OF A PHILOSOPHER 67 (1864))). 
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algorithms or training data.32 Until these biases are corrected by human 
intervention, perhaps33 the initial biases will be greatly magnified.34 
As if the algorithmic biases were not disturbing enough, these biases are 
not easily observable because they are locked inside what commentators have 
35 
[in these black boxes] are mysterious; we can observe [their] inputs and 
 
 32 As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed: 
[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and flaws in datasets, even 
when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has a self-reinforcing nature, due to the fact 
that the machine s outputs will be used as data for future algorithmic operations. 
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and 
Researchers, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the 
Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017) (noting that 
algorithmic self-reinforcing loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g., retail 
contexts, career contexts, credit decisions, insurance, Google search results, news feeds) ); Sonia K. 
Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 69 (2019) ( Bad 
data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates 
existing forms of bias, potentially impacting minorities as a result. ); Digital Decisions 8, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Digital-Decisions-
Library-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf ( Unreliable or unfair decisions that go unchallenged can 
contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms even more likely to marginalize vulnerable 
populations. ). 
 33 Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett, for example, noted the continuous role of humans in 
algorithmic development: 
Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans are shut out of the process. Even after the 
objective has been set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans are involved in all 
stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the objectives of 
the algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned at the ex ante stage, one must ask: 
Under what circumstances should a human ignore the algorithm s suggestions and intervene after 
the algorithm has made the decision? 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 333, 354 (2019); see also Council Regulation 2016/679 art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (requiring a 
data controller to implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express 
his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing, including 
profiling] ); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing 
whether individuals have a right to a human decision ); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the 
Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017) 
(tracing the historical roots of the right to a human in the loop  back to rights that protect the dignity of 
data subjects). 
 34 See Yu, supra note 26 ( As time passes, the biases generated through these loops will become 
much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or the initial training data. ). 
 35 For book-length treatments of the problems generated by black box  algorithms, see generally 
VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH 
THE POOR (2017); CATHY O NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE 
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
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36 Worse still, these 
disadvantaged by factors such as race, gender and socio-economic 
37 
affect users more than copyright holders or technology platforms, as the two 
latter groups will have more political clout and will therefore be in better 
positions to build their preferences into those black boxes, or the processes 
used to design them.38 
In sum, there are many arguments against the satisfactory deployment 
of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law. If such algorithms are to 
be deployed to a greater extent, policymakers will need to address most, or 
all, of these concerns. 
III.     THE CASE FOR AUTOMATION 
Although policymakers and commentators have remained skeptical 
about the feasibility of developing automated systems to promote fair use in 
copyright law, several major arguments exist to support greater algorithmic 
deployment. This Part outlines each argument in turn. 
 
 36 PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 3; see also EUBANKS, supra note 35, at 5 ( [T]hat s the thing about 
being targeted by an algorithm: you get a sense of a pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned 
toward you, but you can t put your finger on exactly what s amiss. ); Rainie & Anderson, supra note 29, 
at 19 There is a larger problem with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the risk of error 
or discrimination the increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human 
accountability.  (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center)). 
 37 Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-1.20805. As Cathy O Neil observed: 
[Algorithm-driven weapons of math destruction] tend to punish the poor. This is, in part, because 
they are engineered to evaluate large numbers of people. They specialize in bulk, and they re cheap. 
That s part of their appeal. The wealthy, by contrast, often benefit from personal input. A white-shoe 
law firm or an exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-to-face 
interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school district. The privileged, we ll 
see time and again, are processed more by people, the masses by machines. 
O NEIL, supra note 35, at 8; see also EUBANKS, supra note 35, at 12 (lamenting how [a]utomated 
decision-making shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies discrimination, and 
compromises our deepest national values ); Rainie & Anderson, supra note 29, at 63 65 (surveying views 
on whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age). 
 38 See COHEN, supra note 7, at 193 ( Industry standard-making processes . . . are lengthy, 
secretive, and notoriously resistant to public interest oversight. ); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 616 (2003) ( [N]ot all standards processes include end user representation, 
and even in those that do, there is no assurance that end user grievances, once aired, will prospectively 
shape the standards that are brought to market. ). See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT 
MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how 
legislative capture by the copyright industries has undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & 
STEVEN TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN 
GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 64 89 (2017) (discussing capture in the intellectual property area). 
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A.     Gradual Deployment 
The first major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to 
promote fair use concerns the need to take incremental steps if automated fair 
use systems are to be developed. Just because the current state of technology 
does not support perfect automated fair use determinations does not mean 
that we should not try to deploy algorithms to a more limited extent. As 
Microsoft software architects Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia declared in 
the early 2000s: 
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair 
use, as it is understood today,] should not stop us from 
attempting to identify a useful subset we might approximate 
in code. That is, we can take a purely pragmatic engineering 
approach. . . . Focus first on defining and modeling a useful 
subset of fair use rights in some policy language, then add 
these expressions to the policy evaluators of [digital rights 
management] systems.39 
More recently, Niva Elkin-
intends to create on the rights of authors must . . . be embedded in the design 
40 
In an article written for the Inaugural Summit on Intellectual Property 
and Digital Media organized by The Cable Center and the University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law in May 2006, I also noted the need to 
distinguish between limitations and exceptions that can be interpreted by 
machines from those that cannot.41 As I explained at that time: 
 
 39 Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM Systems, 
COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 63. Matthew Sag concurred: 
The difficulty of completely automating fair use analysis does not suggest . . . that algorithms have 
no role to play. Experience, common sense, and recent empirical research suggest that there are some 
objective characteristics that make a finding of fair use more likely, and there is no reason in 
principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common situations associated 
with a higher probability of fair use. 
Sag, supra note 21, at 531 32. Likewise, Timothy Armstrong observed: 
The flaw in the conclusion that [digital rights management] cannot accommodate fair use is an 
unduly hasty inductive leap from the specific (the impossibility of modeling the substance of fair 
use law in machine-administrable form) to the general (the supposed impossibility of protecting fair 
use at all in [digital rights management] systems). The foreclosure of one avenue for protecting fair 
use, however, does not imply that all avenues are likewise foreclosed, but only that design principles 
other than the creation of a perfect judge on a chip  must be explored. 
Armstrong, supra note 4, at 88. 
 40 Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017). 
 41 See Yu, supra note 4, at 63 73 (discussing the need for such a distinction); see also Deirdre 
Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in Rights Expression Languages, in 
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The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are 
uncertain and that software code at the current state of 
technology may not be able to capture the full range of 
exceptions and limitations in the copyright system does not 
mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the 
[digital rights management] systems.42 
Drawing on research in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights, to 
which intellectual property rights belong,43 I suggested that automated fair 
minimum essential 
 before the coverage is expanded to take 
advantage of technological improvements and increased technical 
resources.44 
B.     Extant Deployment 
The second argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to 
promote fair use relates to the fact that such deployment has already taken 
place in the area of copyright enforcement.45 Whether we like it or not, 
 
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, DRM 2002, 
WASHINGTON, DC, USA, NOVEMBER 18, 2002: REVISED PAPERS 137 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2002) 
(discussing ways and challenges to implementing copyright limitations and exceptions in rights expression 
languages, with a focus on XrML, the eXtensible Rights Markup Language); Fox & LaMacchia, supra 
note 39, at 63 (considering the importance of determining how to create machine-interpretable 
expressions that adequately model a set (or subset) of fair use rights ). 
 42 Yu, supra note 4, at 63. 
 43 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring each state party to the Covenant to recognize the right of everyone . . . 
[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author. ); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material 
Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author 
(Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) (providing an 
authoritative interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights). 
 44 Yu, supra note 4, at 65 66. As I elaborated: 
Under this proposal, software code would be used to accommodate machine-interpretable 
noninfringing uses, while the determination of the machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses 
would remain in the province of courts. As technology advanced and computer programming 
became more sophisticated, [digital rights management] systems would be able to accommodate 
more noninfringing uses. The domain of machine-interpretable noninfringing uses would therefore 
expand, leaving fewer and fewer copyright matters to courts. 
Id. at 65. 
 45 As Professor Sag observed: 
[D]espite the lack of a de jure obligation to filter under the DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act], many platforms typically large-scale commercial enterprises are nonetheless implementing 
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copyright holders will continue to expand such deployment, due in large part 
to the efficiency and effectiveness provided by automation. A case in point 
is Y
on to the platform every day,46 it is virtually impossible for this streaming 
platform to manually review each uploaded video file. 
Thus far, the Content ID system deployed by YouTube has been the 
most widely cited example of automated copyright enforcement.47 Using 
hashes or digital fingerprints, this system compares files uploaded by Internet 
users with the reference files provided by copyright holders.48 If the files 
match, copyright h
49 When musical works or sound recordings 
are involved, the right holders can also mute the video. Although the 
enforcement provided by the Content ID system has been both underinclusive 
and overinclusive,50 the copyright industries and their supportive 
 
automated copyright enforcement systems. At the present time, platforms using automated copyright 
enforcement include Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube, Facebook, SoundCloud, Twitch, 
TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo. The pressure to adopt automated filtering comes primarily 
from rightsholders, but these systems also meet some of the business objectives of platforms. 
Sag, supra note 21, at 538 39; see also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN 
OUR DIGITAL LIVES 72 (2019) ( Automated copyright detection systems have now been built into many 
other services on the Internet. Facebook has developed its own detection systems, and companies like 
Audible Magic produce software that has been adopted by many platforms. ); Burk, supra note 9, at 284 
( In the area of copyright, protection of digitized works is already increasingly mediated by algorithmic 
enforcement systems that are intended to effectuate the rights of copyright owners while simultaneously 
limiting the liability of content intermediaries. ); Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo 
Notice, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2015, at 28 (expressing concern about the growing use of robo notices to take 
down potentially infringing copyrighted materials). 
 46 See Sag, supra note 21, at 539 ( Collectively, YouTube users now upload more than half a 
million hours of video and watch hundreds of millions of hours of video every day. ). 
 47 See How Content ID Works, supra note 21. 
 48 As Professor Sag explained: 
Content ID begins by taking reference files submitted by a person claiming to represent the copyright 
owner and converting such files into a hash file or a digital fingerprint. In computer science, a hash 
function is used to map information of indeterminate size to a long string of letters and digits of fixed 
size. A perfect  hash function will generate a unique hash for each unique input. The 128-bit hash 
for the previous paragraph is ObllcO463b44082968blf3eedffbOf80, the hash for the same text with 
the word Banana  substituted for DMCA  is 2863eb5ee4acdb9dO37ea9541ce16b62. Neither text 
can be reverse engineered from their hash values, but once the texts are encoded as hash values it is 
trivial to compare them to see if one is a match for the other. Using hash values to match audio and 
visual content encoded in differing file formats is no trivial task, but the concepts are similar. Using 
these hash values, new user content is automatically compared to the reference file as it is uploaded 
to the site. The system can match audio and/or video; it can detect partial and degraded quality 
matches as well as perfect high quality copies. 
Sag, supra note 21, at 545 (footnote omitted). 
 49 How Content ID Works, supra note 21. 
 50 As Nicolas Suzor observed: 
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policymakers and commentators have slowly embraced it and other similar 
monitoring and filtering tools. In Europe, for instance, the recently adopted 
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market imposes copyright 
liability on Internet service providers should they fail to put in place filtering 
technology that would protect the copyrighted content disseminated online.51 
C.     Technological Improvements 
The third major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to 
promote fair use pertains to the new technological advances relating to big 
data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Although the Content ID 
system has provided a paradigmatic example of automated copyright 
enforcement, it has yet to realize the full potential generated by these new 
advances. With the incorporation of big data analytics and machine learning 
capabilities and the development of learning algorithms, or so-called 
52 automated fair use systems will not only function more 
 
Of course, not everybody is happy with Content ID. The system provides no reliable way to resolve 
disputes about fair use, which upsets both copyright owners and video creators. In modern 
equivalents to Stephanie Lenz s dancing baby case, the YouTube algorithm will automatically flag 
music and other copyrighted material that is caught in the background of a video. It will also 
automatically catch content used in a critique or parody. YouTube s Content ID system cannot tell 
the difference between someone who copies a few minutes of, say, a professional sporting event to 
make fun of it and someone who shares parts of a match in a way that might deprive the distributors 
of revenue. In these cases, YouTube creators have to go through a process to try to convince the 
copyright owner that their use is fair. Ultimately, the copyright owner makes the decision: if they 
reject the user s claim, they are redirected through the DMCA process to lodge a formal takedown 
request. At this point, unless the YouTube user files a counter-notice, they ll get a strike  against 
their account. If a user gets three strikes in ninety days, Google will terminate their account. 
SUZOR, supra note 45, at 72. 
 51 Article 17(4)(b) of the Directive provides: 
If no authorisation [from the rightholders] is granted, online content-sharing service providers shall 
be liable for unauthorised acts of communication to the public, including making available to the 
public, of copyright-protected works and other subject matter, unless the service providers 
demonstrate that they have . . . made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional 
diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for 
which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary 
information . . . . 
Directive 2019/790 art. 17(4)(b), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. See generally Martin Senftleben, Bermuda 
Triangle: Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-Generated Content Under the New Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 480, 482 85 (2019) (highlighting 
the challenges posed by the new filtering obligation under the EU Directive). 
 52 See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE 
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 6 (2015) ( Learning algorithms also known as 
learners are algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own 
programs, so we don t have to. ). 
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efficiently and effectively, but their decisions will also bear stronger 
resemblances to those made by real-life judges.53 
Moreover, evidence has already emerged to show that intelligent 
machines can perform select tasks better than humans. For instance, 
researchers have documented the advantage of using learning algorithms to 
diagnose cancer and to perform other tasks in the health area.54 
55 In addition, the performance of 
intelligent machines will not be affected by emotion, exhaustion, stress, or 
other cognitive barriers.56 These machines can also be tested and therefore 
 
 53 As Niva Elkin-Koren reminded us: 
Overall, th[e] concerns regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use overlook recent 
developments in Artificial Intelligence . . . and machine learning capabilities. AI has already been 
applied in very sophisticated contexts: physicians use algorithms to guide their diagnoses; banks use 
them to decide when to approve a loan; security agencies use AI to identify risks; lawyers use them 
to perform due diligence; and even courts rely on algorithms for sentencing, by scoring the risk of 
the offender committing future crimes. AI has already been applied for decision-making processes 
in contexts that are far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death, health, 
financial risks, and national security. 
Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 97. 
 54 As Jonathan Guo and Li Bin observed: 
Esteva et al. trained deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) based on a dataset of 129,450 
clinical images to diagnose skin cancer. The results demonstrated that this system is able to classify 
skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists. . . . Liu from Google, Inc. reported a CNN 
framework to aid the pathological diagnosis of breast cancer metastasis in lymph nodes. The results 
showed that this system could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis, as well as 
reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human pathologists. 
Jonathan Guo & Li Bin, 
Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018); see also TOPOL, supra note 17, at 117 18 
(discussing the impressive progress in algorithmic image processing). 
 55 Digital Decisions, supra note 32, at 4. 
 56 See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL Y 111, 
144 ( Unlike humans, algorithms do not have self-interests affecting their judgement, they do not omit 
any of the decision-making stages or base their decisions on heuristics or biases, and they are not subject 
to human physical or emotional limitations such as exhaustion, stress or emotionality.  (footnotes 
omitted)); Rebecca Crootof, Cyborg Justice  and the Risk of Technological Legal Lock-in, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. F. 233, 236 (2019) (noting that a judge s sensitivity to context and penchant for leniency may 
vary dramatically with whether they are hungry, tired, bored, overworked, overwhelmed, or otherwise 
distracted ); Lim, supra note 2, at 834 ( AI does not suffer from perceptual limitations the way that 
humans do. ); Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (Nat l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,611), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22611.pdf (documenting the 
surprising impact of unexpected outcomes of football games on the type and length of sentences handed 
down by juvenile court judges); Kurt Kleiner, Lunchtime Leniency: Judges  Rulings Are Harsher When 
They Are Hungrier, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunchtime-
leniency/ ( Judges granted 65 percent of requests they heard at the beginning of the day s session and 
almost none at the end. Right after a snack break, approvals jumped back to 65 percent again.  (citing a 
study at Ben Gurion University in Israel and Columbia University examining more than 1000 decisions 
by eight Israeli judges who ruled on convicts  parole requests)). 
344 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:329 
 
improved.57 
58 In fact, as 
Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson remin
humans to acknowledge their biases (how many avowed racists or sexists do 
59 
When the advantages of automation are extrapolated to the fair use 
context, these advantages suggest that automated fair use systems may 
analyze certain fair use factors better than human judges.60 For illustrative 
purposes, consider the analysis of the third factor in the U.S. fair use 
tiality of the portion used 
61 With respect to quantitative 
analysis,62 it is not difficult to see how computers could provide quicker and 
more accurate analysis.63 In fact, any judge seeking to undertake a quick 
quantitative analysis will likely rely on computer assistance to count words 
or compare sizes. 
 
 57 See MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 26, at 53 ( [M]achine-based systems typically can 
be tested and improved. ). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Dan Burk expressed continuous skepticism toward automated fair use determinations: 
It is perhaps not too farfetched to imagine a programmable exception of the fair dealing laundry list 
sort although even for supposedly discrete statutory exceptions, concepts like educational use  or 
news reporting  might be unexpectedly tricky to reduce to computable code. But one can, for 
example, imagine programming a system to determine, perhaps on the basis of geolocational data 
and scraped calendaring or advertising data, whether a nondramatic musical work is being performed 
at an agricultural fair. It is far more difficult to envision how one might program a system to 
determine whether a given use has a relevant degree of impact on the actual or potential market for 
the work being used or whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart  
of an author s creation. 
Burk, supra note 9, at 292 (footnotes omitted). 
 61 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
 62 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.6 (1985) ( The 
inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative . . . aspect. ); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (noting the need to examine the quantity . . . of the 
materials used ). 
 63 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 ( Some fair use considerations might be relatively easy 
to automate, such as the amount copied from the original work. For instance, a program could give a 
higher fair use score based on similarity of less than 10 percent. ). 
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With respect to qualitative analysis,64 however, the lack of emotion and 
empathy in machines65 may suggest their limited ability to determine66 what 
67 On its face, this suggestion 
is valid.68 Making value judgment is not the forte of automated systems. In 
reality, however, there already exists a large trove of data concerning which 
pages or sentences of a book Kindle users have highlighted the most.69 
Netflix also keeps track of the parts of a movie or TV program that its 
subscribers have paused or viewed repeatedly.70 While those highlighted 
lines or repeat plays may not provide perfect proxies for the heart of the 
works, they constitute powerful evidence on which parts of the works many 
users have found important or interesting. 
Likewise, intelligent machines can analyze well the fourth factor in the 
71 This analysis will 
be even better if the machines can collect additional market information that 
is currently not in the possession of copyright holders, users, or technology 
 
 64 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) ( [The third] factor calls for 
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too. ). 
 65 See LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
142 (2018) ( Taking the next step to emotionally intelligent robots may require self-awareness, humor, 
love, empathy, and appreciation for beauty. These are the key hurdles that separate what AI does today
spotting correlations in data and making predictions and artificial general intelligence. ); MCAFEE & 
BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 26, at 123 ( [T]he ability to work effectively with people s emotional states 
and social drives will remain a deeply human skill for some time to come. ); TOPOL, supra note 17, at 
290 ( [H]uman empathy is not something machines can truly simulate, despite ongoing efforts to design 
sociable robots or apps that promote empathy. ); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial 
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1269 71 (1992) (discussing the lack of capacity in artificial 
intelligence for feelings). 
 66 See Burk, supra note 9, at 292 (noting the difficulty in programing an automated fair use system 
to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart  of an 
author s creation ). 
 67 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 600 (analyzing whether the defendant magazine had taken the 
heart of the book ). 
 68 See Burk, supra note 9, at 292 ( It is far more difficult to envision how one might program a 
system to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart  of 
an author s creation. ). 
 69 See Viewing Popular Highlights on Kindles, EBOOK READER BLOG (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://blog.the-ebook-reader.com/2018/02/15/viewing-popular-highlights-on-kindles/ ( Popular 
Highlights show the most highlighted passages that readers have added to Kindle books. . . . Amazon also 
displays how many times each passage has been highlighted. ). 
 70 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming and 
the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1587 (2019) ( Some parameters that Netflix 
tracks include, but are likely not limited to, pause/rewind/fast-forward behavior; day of the week; date of 
viewing; time of viewing; zip code; preferred devices; completion rate; user ratings; user search behavior; 
and browsing and scrolling behavior. ). 
 71 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
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platforms. Using big data analysis, algorithms can analyze the collected 
information to predict 
markets of the copyrighted work. Such collection and analysis will overcome 
the widely noted problem of having insufficient information about the 
circumstances surrounding the specific use of a copyrighted work.72 To be 
sure, intelligent machines may not be able to make better predictions than 
trained economists or valuation experts.73 Nevertheless, they will be able to 
draw conclusions more quickly than humans, and will thereby facilitate real-
time market analysis that will be both costly and time-consuming when 
conducted manually. Moreover, artificial intelligence has already been 
widely deployed in the financial area to provide predictive analysis.74 Such 
analysis will only improve with technological improvements. 
Finally, if deep learning, or the use of neural networks, is involved,75 the 
comparison between automated and human performance will become even 
 
 72 See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 (identifying the [l]ack of knowledge about the circumstances  
of the use as one of the two key reasons why fair use cannot be built into digital rights management 
systems). As Professor Elkin-Koren explained: 
[One] concern [regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use] is that algorithms that analyze fair 
use will fail to process information that is external to the content itself. For instance, determining 
the nature of use may require external information and additional analysis of facts. Yet, algorithms 
could be programmed to extract and analyze data from external sources. For instance, educational 
use might be determined based on tagging the nature of the user. A program could detect the type of 
user (e.g., educational institution, governmental agency) based on the domain name (e.g., .edu, .gov) 
or by checking registration in external databases. Another indication for the nature of use could be 
the type of tagging selected by the party that uploads the work (educational, commercial, 
personal/private use). The commercial nature of use might actually be determined by the presence 
of advertisements, or other means of monetizing the content. External information might also be 
used to determine the effect of the use upon the potential market  for the copyrighted work, using 
the commercial nature of use as a proxy. 
Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1095 96. 
 73 See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 ( [T]he fourth factor in the [fair use] test evaluates the effect of 
the use on the market for the original work. It requires reasoning about the economics of a particular 
market, a task even well-trained humans find difficult. ). 
 74 The literature emergent in this area is vast and fast-growing. See, e.g., William Magnuson, 
Artificial Financial Intelligence, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the dangers and 
real-world limitations of deploying artificial intelligence in finance). 
 75 As a government report on artificial intelligence explained: 
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of a set of units (or 
neurons ). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce an output value, which in turn is 
passed on to other neurons downstream. For example, in an image recognition application, a first 
layer of units might combine the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the image; a 
second layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize patterns-of-patterns; a 
third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so on. 
NAT L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 9 (2016). For 
discussions of deep learning, see generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 104
09 (2016); KELLEHER, supra note 15; JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 121 30 
(2018); THIERRY POIBEAU, MACHINE TRANSLATION 181 95 (2017). 
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more complicated because automated fair use determinations may not 
analyze the individual factors the same way a judge or a copyright lawyer 
would.76 As Dan Burk observed: 
One can imagine that a neural network or other machine 
learning system could detect these or other patterns in the 
data surrounding past cases, matching them to similar 
patterns in the data surrounding future fair use incidents, 
situations, and scenarios without formal programming 
definition of the fair use factors.77 
While one could argue that a proper fair use analysis must be conducted the 
same way as how judges would, one cannot help but wonder whether society 
would find it acceptable to have automated fair use determinations that 
generate outcomes that have high correlations to the outcomes of judge-made 
decisions.78 
D.     Scalability 
The fourth major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment 
to promote fair use regards the scalability of automated fair use systems.79 As 
Charles Clark noted in a book chapter that has been widely cited for its title, 
80 With the creation and 
 
 76 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 ( AI and machine learning would make it difficult for 
courts to check the rules embedded in the system, since these systems may not explicitly demonstrate the 
legal specifications of the four factors of fair use. ). 
 77 Burk, supra note 9, at 293. 
 78 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 (noting that, with the growing use of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning, courts may have to determin[e] acceptable error rates when testing 
the outcome of such a system compared to determination by the court ). 
 79 See AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 67 (2018) ( One major benefit of prediction machines is that they can scale in a way that 
humans cannot. ); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT 
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 97 (2018) ( Artificial 
intelligence techniques offer . . . to solve the problem of scale. ); Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat 
the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2019) 
( Compared with the legal system, software has enormous advantages of scale and efficacy of 
enforcement. It might tirelessly handle billions if not trillions of decisions in the time it takes a human 
court to decide a single case. ). 
 80 Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN 
A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (capitalization omitted). William Patry 
pointed out the title of Clark s chapter is largely misnamed because that chapter concluded that the 
answer to the machine may turn out to be not only in the machine, but the machine will certainly be an 
important part of the answer.  WILLIAM F. PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 236 41 (2011). 
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dissemination of hundreds of exabytes of data and digital content every day,81 
it is almost impossible for technology platforms to not rely on algorithms to 
determine whether a specific use of a copyrighted work has complied with 
copyright law.82 The need for such reliance is indeed why YouTube has 
deployed the Content ID system to facilitate online copyright enforcement.83 
Fortunately, the greater deployment of algorithms to promote fair use may 
help address such an ever-growing deluge of content. As Professor Elkin-
Koren observed: 
Algorithmic fair use could offer a workable solution for a 
growing number of circumstances that involve a large 
volume of content in which the costs of determining fair use 
on a case-by-case basis, and the risk of mistakenly 
determining fair use, are simply too high. That is the case, 
for instance, in educational institutions which make large 
quantities of teaching materials available for educational 
purposes using e-reserve systems.84 
To be sure, a time gap will always exist between the latest judicial 
decision and the legal rules and outcomes that programmers manage to 
encode in the algorithms.85 Nevertheless, if automated fair use systems are 
constantly upgraded, the time lag between the two may be much more 
acceptable and less problematic.86 Moreover, those human actors who 
 
 81 See Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 17, 
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f/ 
( By 2025, it s estimated that 463 exabytes of data will be created each day globally that s the equivalent 
of 212,765,957 DVDs per day! ); see also Sag, supra note 21, at 513 ( In 2016, YouTube users were 
uploading 400 hours of video content every minute . . . ). 
 82 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1098 ( The need to address the sheer volume of copyright 
disputes requires a new approach to fair use that involves rethinking the role of legal oversight in 
algorithmic adjudication. ); Sag, supra note 21, at 554 ( With over 400 hours of video being uploaded to 
YouTube every minute, it is hard to imagine that either rightsholders, or the platform itself, could 
meaningfully prevent the evisceration of online copyright without relying on automation to some extent. ). 
 83 See supra Part III.B (discussing the YouTube s Content ID system). 
 84 Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100. 
 85 See Burk, supra note 9, at 298 ( [O]ne concern that could stem from the dynamic legal nature 
of fair use is whether automated instantiation of fair use freezes the standard as of the time it was encoded, 
so that the law and the algorithm diverge. ). 
 86 See id. ( The algorithm could of course be updated to learn or incorporate shifts in the legal 
standard. ); Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1097 ( Machine learning capabilities could ensure that the 
system is up to date because the classifications applied by the algorithm are constantly refined based on 
new fair use rulings. ). This constant upgrade could be compared to the frequent and virtually 
instantaneous updates found in the thirteen legacy root zone servers containing information about Internet 
domain names: 
As a past legacy, the database in the A Root Server, which the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers ( ICANN ) currently controls by virtue of its contract with the U.S. 
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constantly have to make fair use determinations, such as Internet users and 
copyright enforcement personnel, do not always keep track of all the latest 
fair use decisions. If machines can learn those decisions more quickly than 
the relevant human actors such as judges, lawyers, and law enforcement 
personnel automated fair use systems can still be highly appealing. After 
all, the limited number of fair use cases suggest that most fair use 
determinations are made outside the courtroom.87 
E.     Low-Cost Determinations 
The fifth major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to 
promote fair use involves the ability of automated fair use systems to provide 
low-cost determinations to a large number of people who otherwise may not 
be able to afford copyright lawyers.88 As Lawrence Lessig put it memorably, 
89 With automation, the greater deployment of algorithms will 
help those users who cannot afford to hire lawyers, or hire them frequently, 
to explore the boundaries of the law or to provide the support needed to test 
those boundaries.90 If automated fair use determinations can have legal 
effects even if only on an interim basis those determinations can enlarge 
the creative spaces of risk-averse users, some of whom may fear that their 
creative endeavors will violate current copyright law.91 
Although automated fair use systems can help users, those systems can 
also harm users if the algorithms involved fail to capture the full range of 
limitations and exceptions in copyright law. Indeed, when Dan Burk and Julie 
Cohen analyzed this topic about two decades ago, one of their key concerns 
was that automated systems would end up encouraging minimalist 
 
Department of Commerce . . . , is considered authoritative. The other root servers merely copy this 
root zone file to their servers. 
Peter K. Yu, The Origins of ccTLD Policymaking, 12 CARDOZO J. INT L & COMP. L. 387, 390 (2004). 
 87 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57 58 ( Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum 
standards are not the only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more accurate 
measure of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users. ). 
 88 Thanks to Hannibal Travis for pushing me on this point. 
 89 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004). 
 90 See Burk, supra note 9, at 289 ( Automated identification and removal, whether accurate or 
mistaken, is relatively cheap, whereas legal and institutional engagement is comparatively expensive. ). 
 91 See id. at 288 ( Risk averse content users, unable to confidently predict the ultimate decision 
on their activities, may forgo some socially beneficial uses. ); Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100 ( The 
high cost and high risk involved in fair use implementation prevents users from taking advantage of 
productive uses that can foster copyright goals, simply because they fear liability. ). 
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interpretations of important safeguards and the establishment of ceilings for 
these safeguards.92 As they observed: 
We are . . . skeptical . . . about the ability of negotiated 
[technical] defaults to capture the full range of social benefit 
that more flexible legal standards allow. While these defaults 
sometimes might allow access that would exceed fair use 
more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair use. We 
suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede 
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would 
constitute fair use indeed, it was just such insistence upon 
minimalist guidelines by rights holders that led to the 
collapse of the [Conference on Fair Use] discussions. 
for educational copying, rights holders, content users, and 
even courts have shown a deplorable tendency to act as 
though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair use. To 
the contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair 
use minima: a floor rather than a ceiling. We are 
consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure 
based solely on the design of similar defaults into self-
-
effect could be even more pernicious.93 
Thus, whether algorithmic deployment can benefit users will depend on 
whether the algorithms involved have been properly designed. 
In sum, like the existence of arguments asserting why algorithms cannot 
be satisfactorily deployed to promote fair use, there are also many arguments 
supporting such deployment. Whether algorithms should be deployed to a 
greater extent may ultimately depend on a cost-benefit analysis that weighs 
the strengths of automated fair use systems against their weaknesses. Such 
analysis will likely vary, depending on whether the analysis is conducted 
from the perspective of the copyright holder, the user, the technology 
platform, or another stakeholder in the copyright system. 
 
 92 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57; see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 ( The main 
concern is that reducing the four-factor analysis into a simplistic and somewhat rigid set of algorithmic 
instructions might cause some important aspects of fair use analysis to get lost along the way. ). 
 93 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57. 
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IV.     ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 
Given the existence of these strengths, policymakers and commentators 
will need to pay increased attention to ways that could help develop an 
environment to support the greater deployment of automated fair use 
systems.94 Such increased attention is important for at least three reasons. 
First, the copyright industries and technology platforms may choose to make 
greater algorithmic deployment even when they are well aware of the many 
documented weaknesses of automated copyright enforcement.95 They would 
do so either because they disagree with the skeptics or because they see the 
benefits of automation outweighing its costs. Second, the more supportive 
this environment is, the greater the benefits of such deployment will become. 
Such growing support would therefore not only tip the balance of the cost-
benefit analysis toward greater automation but would also provide an 
promote fair use in copyright law.96 Third, preparation is well advised 
because changes in this area are likely to be fast and sudden, similar to how 
quickly digital technology disrupted the business models of brick-and-mortar 
companies two decades ago.97 While Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee 
98 Lee 
 
 94 For those policymakers and commentators who find greater automation undesirable, the 
establishment of this supporting environment would make thing worse. Nevertheless, this Article takes 
the view that greater automation is not only beneficial but also inevitable. Even if fair use is not automated 
to a greater extent, copyright enforcement will be. If we are to retain, or restore, the balance of the 
copyright system, greater algorithmic deployment will be highly sensible. 
 95 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 96 Cf. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 213 16 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) (discussing the 
importance of an enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection); Peter K. Yu, 
Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 265 68 (2012) (criticizing the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement for its failure to create the enabling environment needed to foster 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights). 
 97 Napster is frequently noted for its disruption to the music industry s traditional business model. 
See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (discussing the disruption caused by 
Napster and other digital distribution technologies and the creative destruction of copyright). For book-
length treatments documenting the adverse impact of digital distribution on the music industry, see 
generally GREG KOT, RIPPED: HOW THE WIRED GENERATION REVOLUTIONIZED MUSIC (2009); ROBERT 
LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE 
CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK (2011). 
 98 ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, 
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 20 (2014). As the authors observed: Progress 
on some of the oldest and toughest challenges associated with computers, robots, and other digital gear 
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Kai- is not inclined 
99 
To create an environment that will support and enable the greater 
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law, policymakers 
and commentators should focus attention on two distinct types of needs: the 
need for preparation for change and the need for support. This Part discusses 
each need in turn. With respect to the latter, it further offers suggestions on 
what complementary measures policymakers should introduce. 
A.     Need for Preparation for Change 
1.     Legal Practices 
The first set of changes for which policymakers and commentators will 
have to prepare relates to legal practices or, to be more precise, fair use 
practices. The current fair use system is based on precision found in ex post 
decisions. If a user wants to find out whether copyright law permits his or her 
use of a copyrighted work, that user will have to go to a court. Should the 
highest court in the country, such as the United States Supreme Court, decide 
that the use is fair, the legal inquiry will end. Although policymakers, 
commentators, and industry representatives have criticized fair use decisions 
for being unclear and unpredictable,100 the case-by-case analysis provided by 
courts does indicate, with sufficient clarity and predictability, whether 
copyright law permits a specific use. 
When fair use determinations are made by algorithms, however, 
precision will have to give way to high probability101 a trade-off that would 
 
was gradual for a long time. Then in the past few years it became sudden; digital gear started racing ahead, 
accomplishing tasks it had always been lousy at and displaying skills it was not supposed to acquire 
anytime soon.  Id. 
 99 LEE, supra note 65, at 152. 
 100 As the Australian Law Reform Commission observed: 
The opponents of fair use have pointed to research indicating that the outcome of fair use cases is 
unpredictable. The outcome of litigation is never completely predictable if it were, the parties 
would not have commenced litigation, or would likely have settled. This is also true of recent 
litigation over the fair dealing exceptions and specific exceptions. 
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 115 (2013). 
But see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 & n.28 (2009) ( If 
one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same policy cluster, it is generally 
possible to predict whether a use is likely to be fair or unfair. The only clusters of fair use cases in which 
it is quite difficult to predict whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and research use clusters 
where judges have tended to take starkly different perspectives on fair use defenses in these settings . . . ). 
 101 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 ( AI systems do not decide fair use, but simply 
generate a score that reflects the probability of fair use. ); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
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make many lawyers uncomfortable. As noted earlier, the current state of 
102 As a result, 
algorithms are incapable of making precise determinations of what the law 
would or would not permit, unless the use in question is identical, or virtually 
identical, to the use in a previously adjudicated case. Notwithstanding this 
shortcoming, algorithms may be able to determine, with high probability, 
whether the law would permit such a use. Such a determination will become 
even more accurate as automated fair use systems take better advantage of 
big data analysis and machine learning capabilities. 
To the extent that policymakers and commentators are comfortable with 
the change in fair use practices from precision to high probability, the 
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use will receive wider acceptance. 
By contrast, if they remain uncomfortable with this change, they will likely 
discourage greater algorithmic deployment. Thus far, there has been little 
research on whether precision-based fair use analysis will better promote 
creativity than fair use analysis that has attained high probability.103 
Moreover, the limited number of adjudicated fair use cases suggests that most 
fair use determinations found in the creative environment are made ex ante 
outside the courtroom.104 These decisions are therefore based more on 
probability than on precision. If so, the development of automated fair use 
systems that attain high probability may be more appealing than it sounds. 
2.     Creative Practices 
The second set of changes for which policymakers and commentators 
will have to prepare pertains to creative practices. As Part II.B has noted, the 
greater deployment of fair use algorithms may cause users to change their 
creative choices and practices. Such behavioral changes have indeed been a 
key concern of Professor Burk in his latest article on algorithmic fair use.105 
enforcement algorithms threatens to degrade the exception into an 
 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND 
THINK 32 72 (2013) (discussing the trade-offs between exactitude and messiness and between causality 
and correlation). 
 102 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 103 The closest research in this area concerns the differences between court decisions and ordinary 
fair use practices. See, e.g., ASS N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS  STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), 
http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf (stating the best practices in fair use for 
documentary filmmakers). 
 104 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 105 Burk, supra note 9. 
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unrecognizable form. Worse yet, social internalization of a bowdlerized 
version of fair use deployed in algorithmic format is likely to become the new 
106 
we have seen creative practices changing in response to new laws or judicial 
decisions, such as in the area of appropriation art107 and digital sampling.108 
While one could certainly debate whether those changes promote or hurt 
creativity, changes to creative practices are inevitable whenever legal 
decisions are made whether by humans or machines. The key question 
about automated fair use systems is therefore not whether these systems will 
make decisions, but whether they will make worse decisions, or make worse 
decisions more frequently. 
Moreover, the ever-growing utilization of algorithm-driven copyright 
enforcement in technology platforms suggests that creative choices and 
practices will change regardless of whether automated fair use systems are 
deployed or not. In fact, such deployment may help offset the excesses found 
in automated copyright enforcement, thereby providing a better balance to 
the copyright system and instilling a sense of fairness that induces law-
abiding behavior.109 As Professor Elkin-Koren noted emphatically in her 
Nimmer Memorial Le
era of algorithmic governance. The need to develop such tools is necessary 
in order to tilt the copyright balance back to its origin in our robo notice 
110 ]t may seem desirable to 
incorporate context-specific fair use metrics into copyright-policing 
algorithms, both to protect against automated overdeterrence and to inform 
111 
 
 106 Id. at 306. 
 107 For discussions of appropriation art, see generally Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of 
Appropriation Art: The Future of Copyright in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163 
(2014); Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control over 
Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A. 93 (1994); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed 
Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000); Niels 
Schaumann, Fair Use and Appropriation Art, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 112 (2015); David Tan, 
The Transformative Use Doctrine and Fair Dealing in Singapore: Understanding the Purpose and 
Character of Appropriation Art, 24 SING. ACAD. L.J. 832 (2012). 
 108 For discussions of digital sampling, see generally JOANNA TERESA DEMERS, STEAL THIS 
MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 71 110 (2006); KEMBREW 
MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011). 
 109 See Armstrong, supra note 4, at 109 ( Empowering users to exercise their fair use rights 
without violating the DMCA might . . . increase law-abiding behavior and temper the critical evaluation 
of the DMCA as a one-sided giveaway to powerful producer cartels.  (footnote omitted)). 
 110 Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100. 
 111 Burk, supra note 9, at 284 85. 
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Finally, although the use of automated fair use systems will likely affect, 
or even curtail, select creative practices, one would expect new creative 
practices to be developed in response to the greater deployment of these 
systems. Whether those new practices will be better or worse from a creative 
standpoint is difficult to judge. Moreover, social practices, including creative 
practices, are constantly defined and redefined through their interactions with 
technology, and vice versa. Just as automated fair use systems will shape 
creative practices, the changing creative practices will also shape those 
systems.112 In the age of artificial intelligence, in which machines are 
constantly learning and improving, there is a good chance that the 
development of new creative practices and the availability of more 
information for big data analysis would lead to modifications that would 
allow algorithms to better promote creativity. 
B.     Need for Support 
1.     Judicial Support 
Apart from the increased preparedness for the two sets of changes 
mentioned above, policymakers will need to introduce complementary 
measures to support automated fair use systems if these systems are to be 
developed. The first type of measures concern judicial support. Even with the 
greater use of automated systems, courts will remain highly important. As 
 
 112 Tarleton Gillespie noted the entanglement between algorithms and social practices: 
[W]e must consider not [the algorithms ] effect  on people, but a multidimensional entanglement  
between algorithms put into practice and the social tactics of users who take them up. This 
relationship is, of course, a moving target, because algorithms change, and the user populations and 
activities they encounter change as well. Still, this should not imply that there is no relationship. As 
these algorithms nestle into people s daily lives and mundane information practices, users shape and 
rearticulate the algorithms they encounter; and algorithms impinge on how people seek information, 
how they perceive and think about the contours of knowledge, and how they understand themselves 
in and through public discourse. 
 It is important that we conceive of this entanglement not as a one-directional influence, but as a 
recursive loop between the calculations of the algorithm and the calculations  of people. The 
algorithm that helps users navigate Flickr s photo archive is built on the archive of photos posted, 
which means it is designed to apprehend and reflect back the choices made by photographers. What 
people do and do not photograph is already a kind of calculation, though one that is historical, 
multivalent, contingent, and sociologically informed. But these were not Flickr s only design 
impulses; sensitivity to photographic practices had to compete with cost, technical efficiency, legal 
obligation, and business imperatives. And the population of Flickr users and the types of photos they 
post changed as the site grew in popularity, was forced to compete with Facebook, introduced tiered 
pricing, was bought by Yahoo, and so forth. 
Gillespie, supra note 24, at 183. 
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circumstan 113 In a proposal advanced more than a decade ago, I also 
courts (and human actors) to intervene when needed.114 Although automation 
enhances efficiency and effectiveness, human intervention can be highly 
beneficial. To some extent, the debate about the need for such intervention 
ties to the ongoing debate about whether machines can perform as well as 
lawyers or judges.115 
Should we end up choosing to develop automated fair use systems that 
include judicial intervention at the end of the process, the determinations 
made by these systems should be viewed as interim, rather than final.116 In 
effect, such systems will provide technically driven safe harbors for users 
until courts step in to make adjustments. Given the potential, and likely 
constant, modification of these safe harbors, one inevitably will wonder what 
would happen should a court find out months, or years, later that an earlier 
automated fair use determination was incorrect.117 
While it is impossible to go back in time, automated fair use systems 
can be utilized to facilitate compensation. Consider, for example, a system 
that has been built into a technology platform that disseminates uploaded 
 
 113 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 75; see also Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in 
Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 551 (2005) ( [T]echnological 
controls tend to be relatively blunt instruments for control of digital content, unable to accommodate 
copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human discretion. ). 
 114 See Yu, supra note 4, at 73 ( [A] two-step approach technology first, then courts seems to 
be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth considering developing such a system as we 
explore the next generation of [digital rights management] systems. ). Niva Elkin-Koren outlined a similar 
approach: Algorithmic fair use could . . . involve a two-tier review. First, algorithmic screening would 
be performed and second, for cases which were flagged by the system, but were inconclusive, human 
review would be conducted.  Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1098. 
 115 For discussions in this area, see generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: 
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Crootof, supra 
note 56; Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325 (2019); Andrew C. Michaels, 
Artificial Intelligence, Legal Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (2020); Frank 
Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2019); Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers, Lawyers, 
and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501 (2017); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and 
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135 (2019); Wu, 
supra note 79. For earlier discussions in this area (collected in Professor Volokh s article), see generally 
Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); Anthony D Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 
GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman : An Experiment in Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977). 
 116 See Burk, supra note 9, at 297 ( Patterns detected by a machine evaluating fair use-related data 
should not be confused with a legal institutional determination of fair use. ). 
 117 Thanks to Martin Senftleben for asking this important question. 
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tent ID system. That system could be 
easily designed to allow for dissemination if the probability of fair use is over 
seventy-five percent but prohibit such dissemination if the probability falls 
below fifty percent. For probability that is in between, the system could 
further require the revenue stream to be put in escrow for a certain period of 
time say, six months or a year. 
Should infringement be found later, the court could require the user to 
reverse the revenue stream based on what the system has documented
including, where applicable, that the technology platform releases the 
revenue in escrow to the copyright holder. The court could also grant 
injunctive relief, as the law currently allows.118 Should the copyright holder 
prefer injunctive relief over compensation, he or she could file a complaint 
in court as soon as the alleged infringement has been discovered. Should the 
copyright holder choose to tolerate such infringement, he or she would still 
have the option to seek compensation and injunctive relief later, as long as 
the statute of limitations had not been tolled.119 
Obviously, the automated fair use system proposed here could be 
calibrated very differently, depending on legislative or policy preferences. 
For instance, the seventy-five percent threshold could be easily adjusted 
upward to eighty or ninety percent or downward to 66.7 percent. Such an 
adjustment will affect the creative space available to users. In addition, even 
though the proposal anticipates that only courts will grant injunctive relief, 
that type of relief could be easily built into the system, similar to how 
specific copyrighted work. The key takeaway of this proposal is not its fine 
details, but that algorithms can be carefully designed and tailored to 
accommodate a wide variety of preferences and situations. We should not 
have a simplistic assumption that automated fair use systems can, or will, 
make only binary determinations for example, whether the use is fair or 
not. 
2.     Technological Support 
The second type of complementary measures relates to technological 
support. If automated fair use systems are to be developed, the algorithms 
involved have to be trusted by the different stakeholders in the copyright 
system.120 As a result, impartiality has to be built into the algorithms from the 
 
 118 See 8) (providing injunction as a remedy for copyright infringement). 
 119 See 17 U.S.C. No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title 
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued. ). 
 120 As a National Research Council study reminded us: 
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very beginning. To do so, it would be important to set up a neutral and 
representative body that would supervise the development of fair use 
algorithms.121 These algorithms could not be designed solely by the copyright 
industries that want to maximize enforcement, those technology platforms 
that seek to avoid copyright lawsuits and legal liability, or a combination of 
these two groups of players.122 
Considering the likely existence of a wide variety of algorithms that 
could make automated fair use determinations,123 a process can be further 
developed to facilitate the certification of different algorithms that are equally 
capable of making high-quality decisions. Having such a process is desirable 
because it will facilitate competition over algorithmic quality.124 Should there 
 
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from authors and publishers, to 
consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and viewing public), to libraries and educational institutions, 
to governmental and standards bodies. Each of the stakeholders has a variety of concerns . . . that 
are at times aligned with those of other stakeholders, and at other times opposed. An individual 
stakeholder may also play multiple roles with various concerns. At different times, a single 
individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or shareholder in publishing or 
entertainment companies; a member of an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly society that 
relies on publishing for revenue. The dominant concern will depend on the part played at the 
moment. 
COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT L RES. COUNCIL, THE 
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 51 (2000); see also Mark Stefik, 
Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital 
Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 156 (1997) (identifying among the stakeholders relevant to a 
proposed Digital Property Trust publishers, trusted system vendors, financial institutions, lawmakers, 
librarians, and consumers ); Yu, supra note 4, at 31 (noting that stakeholders in the copyright debate, and 
the debate on digital rights management systems in particular, cannot be nicely divided into binaries). 
 121 See Yu, supra note 4, at 68 ( [W]e need to develop a process that brings together copyright 
holders, technology developers, consumer advocates, civil libertarians and other stakeholders. ); see also 
COHEN, supra note 7, at 192 ( Mastering the processes by which technical standards are developed . . . 
requires . . . new public accountability mechanisms. ). 
 122 See Armstrong, supra note 4, at 121 ( The more technology reflects only one set of interests, 
. . . the more it departs from the law, which conceptualizes copyright as a balancing of interests, with the 
ultimate goal of fostering both creative expression and broad public availability of creative works. ); see 
also Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682 (2017) ( A prejudiced 
decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes with the intent of 
generating discriminatory results. ). 
 123 See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 79, at 189 ( There is often no single right answer to the 
question of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools, because AIs involve trade-offs: more 
speed, less accuracy; more autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy. ). 
 124 As I noted in a recent article: 
Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more effective, and less biased 
algorithms. Such competition is particularly needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly 
difficult, or time consuming, to explain. Indeed, without competition, it would be hard to identify 
problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that algorithm has provided the best solution 
in light of the existing technological conditions and constraints. 
Yu, supra note 26 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Producer s Right and the Protection of 
Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is a critical area 
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oach will allow courts, or the certification body, to step in. 
Although it would be ideal to eliminate all disagreements, for the sake of 
clarity and predictability, the preference for competition presumes the 
existence of disagreements and diversity. Moreover, disagreements over fair 
use interpretations are not uncommon within our current copyright system. 
In the U.S. federal system, courts at both the horizontal and vertical levels do 
not always agree on their interpretations of copyright law.125 
Once developed, automated fair use systems will have to be constantly 
audited to ensure that the systems remain neutral and the outcomes consistent 
with existing copyright law.126 Such constant auditing reflects the best 
practices advocated by the technology community. Principle 7 of the ACM 
Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability declared: 
document those methods and results. In particular, they should routinely 
perform tests to assess and determine whether the model generates 
127 The FAT/ML Principles for Accountable 
Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms also called for 
t 
 
relating to data governance ); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA: 
The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1310 
(2018) ( Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices by providing users with a choice between 
competitive products . . . ). 
 125 On disagreements at the horizontal level, compare Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 
1232, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that th[e] reasoning is somewhat circular  when the failure to pay a 
potential licensing fee is used to disprove fair use), with Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 930 31 (2d Cir. 1994) ( [I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular 
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such 
a use is made easier. ). On disagreements at the vertical level, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), rev d, 545 
U.S. 913 (2005). 
 126 As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted: 
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without compromising the intellectual 
property behind the business model. Designing algorithmic systems that can be easily audited 
increases accountability and provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries. 
While explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making, audits are 
necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes. They also make it possible to fix 
problems when they arise. 
Digital Decisions, supra note 32, at 11. But see Kroll et al., supra note 122, at 660 61 (discussing the 
limits to auditing in the algorithmic context). 
 127 ACM Statement, supra note 3. 
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process: design stage, pre-launch, and post- 128 As Lorna McGregor, 
Daragh Murray, and Vivian Ng explained: 
During the design and development stage, impact 
assessments should evaluate how an algorithm is likely to 
work, ensure that it functions as intended and identify any 
problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an 
opportunity to modify the design of an algorithm at an early 
stage, to build in . . . compliance including monitoring 
mechanisms from the outset, or to halt development if . . . 
concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments should 
also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to 
monitor effects during operation. . . . [T]his requires that, 
during design and development, the focus should not only be 
on testing but steps should also be taken to build in effective 
oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to 
identify and respond to [problems] once the algorithm is 
deployed.129 
While algorithmic audits have attracted the attention of many 
commentators, training data increasingly drive the performance of 
algorithms. As a result, these audits have to cover not only the algorithms 
themselves but also training data and algorithmic outcomes.130 When 
learning algorithms are involved, scrutinizing algorithms alone will unlikely 
reveal the full extent of any problems that the automated fair use systems 
may encounter. To the extent privacy concerns are raised when algorithmic 
outcomes are being disclosed for auditing purposes, the audits could focus 
instead on representative, anonymized samples of different algorithmic 
 
 128 Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms, 
FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms (last visited July 9, 
2019). FAT/ML stands for Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning.  Id. 
 129 Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic 
Accountability, 68 INT L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 330 (2019). 
 130 See O NEIL, supra note 35, at 229 ( We have to learn to interrogate our data collection process, 
not just our algorithms. ); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024 25 
(2017) ( What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to see that the 
algorithm is generating discriminatory impact. ); Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency 
in Algorithms, but Too Much Can Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-
need-transparency-in-algorithms-but-too-much-can-backfire ( [M]achine learning algorithms and deep 
learning algorithms in particular are usually built on just a few hundred lines of code. The algorithms 
logic is mostly learned from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code. Which is to say, some 
of today s best-performing algorithms are often the most opaque. ); Kroll et al., supra note 122, at 641 
( [W]ithout full transparency including source code, input data, and the full operating environment of 
the software even the disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides 
no guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system s behavior. ); see also id. 
at 657 60 (discussing the limits to transparency in the algorithmic context). 
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outcomes, or of those outcomes that were based on test data provided by 
auditors or consumer advocacy groups.131 
3.     Legislative Support 
The final type of complementary measures pertains to legislative 
support. If the successful development of automated fair use systems requires 
the collection and big data analysis of additional records that are currently 
not in the possession of copyright holders, users, or technology platforms, we 
will need to introduce legal reforms. We will also need to do so if we are to 
establish an environment that supports the auditing of automated fair use 
systems. 
As commentators have pointed out, the protection of intellectual 
property rights has posed significant barriers to both big data analysis and 
algorithmic audits. Examples range from copyright protection that prevents 
the mining of text and data that can be used for fair use determinations132 to 
 
 131 See Yu, supra note 26 ( [T]echnology developers could provide a representative, anonymized 
sample of the different algorithmic outcomes to enable the public to determine for itself the satisfactoriness 
of algorithm-enhanced technological products and services. ). 
 132 As Amanda Levendowski observed: 
Copyright law causes friction that limits access to training data and restricts who can use certain 
data. This friction is a significant contributor to biased AI. The friction caused by copyright law 
encourages AI creators to use biased, low-friction data . . . for training AI systems, like the word2vec 
toolkit, despite those demonstrable biases. As Google s decision not to freely release the Google 
News corpus reveals, copyright law can also curtail the implementation of bias mitigation 
techniques, including interventions like reweighting algorithmic inputs or supplementing datasets 
with additional data. Copyright law can even preclude potential competitors from converting the 
customers of dominant AI players. . . . 
 Good training data is crucial for creating accurate AI systems. The AI system tasked with 
identifying cats must be able [to] abstract out the right features, or heuristics, of a cat from training 
data. To do so, the training data must be well-selected by humans training data infused with 
implicit bias can result in skewed datasets that fuel both false positives and false negatives. For 
example, a dataset that features only cats with tortoiseshell markings runs the risk that the AI system 
will learn  that a mélange of black, orange, and cream markings [is] a heuristic for identifying a cat 
and mistakenly identify other creatures, like brindle-colored dogs, as cats. Similarly, a dataset that 
features only mainstream domestic cats could create an AI system that learns  that cats have fluffy 
fur, pointy ears, and long tails and fail to identify cats of outlier breeds, like a Devon Rex, Scottish 
Fold, or Manx. And, in both examples, all manner of wildcats are excluded from the training data. 
Levendowski, supra note 31, at 589 92 (footnotes omitted); see also Lim, supra note 2, at 847 55 (noting 
the need for expanding fair use to promote artificial intelligence); Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Artificial 
Intelligence s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 61 79 (2017) (identifying the potential legal 
liability for copyright infringement when copyrighted works are used to train intelligent machines). While 
fair use may need to be expanded to promote artificial intelligence, the non-protection of copyrighted 
works generated by artificial intelligence may provide an ever-growing trove of helpful training data that 
reside in the public domain. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2017) ( [The U.S. Copyright] Office will not register works produced by a 
machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input 
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trade secret protection that prevents the inspection of copyrighted algorithms 
and their protected input, training, and feedback data.133 Outside the 
intellectual property arena, statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act134 also make it difficult for independent auditors to access algorithms. In 
addition, privacy protection, such as the protection found in the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation,135 
abilities to access and collect personally identifying records that are needed 
for fair use determinations. 
Given these barriers and continuous challenges, policymakers will need 
to introduce complementary legal reforms if algorithms are to be deployed to 
 
or intervention from a human author. ); Clark D. Asay, Independent Creation in a World of AI, 14 FIU L. 
REV. 201 (2020) (noting the potentially differing second factor analysis in the fair use determination of 
machine-generated works). But see Grimmelmann, There s No Such Thing, supra note 2, at 403 ( [N]o 
one has ever exhibited even one work that could plausibly claim to have a computer for an author  in the 
sense that the Copyright Act uses the term. ). For discussions of the importance of exceptions for text and 
data mining to the copyright systems, see generally Christophe Geiger et al., Crafting a Text and Data 
Mining Exception for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single Market, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA 95 (Xavier 
Seuba et al. eds., 2018); Michael W. Carroll, Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text and Data 
Mining Is Lawful, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019); Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscape for Text 
Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A. 291 (2019). 
 133 See Burk, supra note 9, at 301 (noting the the explicit or intentional obscurity stemming from 
trade secrecy and protection of confidential business information to the extent that algorithms are 
commissioned or developed by commercial entities, they may attempt to shield proprietary aspects of the 
technology from misappropriation or competitive copying ). For discussions of the tension between 
transparency and disclosure on the one hand and trade secret protection on the other, see generally Sonia 
K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183 (2019); Rebecca Wexler, 
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1343 (2018). 
 134 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). As Sonia Katyal observed: 
[T]he ACLU sued on behalf of four researchers who maintained that [this statute] actually prevented 
them from scraping data from sites, or from creating fake profiles to investigate whether algorithmic 
discrimination led some employment and real estate sites to fail to display certain listings on the 
basis of race or gender. The concern was that the law permitted researchers to be held criminally 
accountable because the research might involve violating one of the sites  Terms of Service, 
something that could carry both prison and fines. As one researcher observed, these laws have the 
perverse effect of protecting data-driven commercial systems from even the most basic external 
analysis.  
Katyal, supra note 32, at 122 (footnotes omitted); see also Levendowski, supra note 31, at 587 88 ( Some 
courts have interpreted the [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] as prohibiting violation of an employer s 
computer-use policies or a website s Terms of Service, which can chill algorithmic accountability testing, 
including digital auditing used to uncover racial discrimination.  (footnote omitted)); Lee, supra note 124, 
at 1311 38 (discussing how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has discouraged algorithmic auditors 
from exposing questionable business practices and has fostered a hostile market for legitimate 
competitors). 
 135 Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 33. 
2020] Can Algorithms Promote Fair Use? 363 
 
a greater extent to promote fair use in copyright law.136 Obviously, fair use is 
only part of the copyright system and an even smaller part of the overall 
legal system. When considering what reform to introduce, policymakers will 
inevitably have to balance the different interests, preferences, and policy 
objectives to determine how best to facilitate the development of automated 
fair use systems. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has documented the case for and against the greater 
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law. If 
policymakers are eager to develop automated fair use systems, they will need 
to be prepared for changes in both legal and creative practices that will be 
brought about by greater algorithmic deployment. They will also need to be 
willing to introduce complementary measures to build a supportive 
environment that will enable and facilitate automated fair use determinations. 
Until we are ready for these changes and until that supportive environment 
can be built, however, it is understandable why many policymakers and 
commentators have remained skeptical of the satisfactory deployment of 
algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law. 
 
 
 136 See Yu, supra note 26 ( To provide support for external audits that do not involve regulatory 
authorities, adjustments will have to be made to those laws that have posed barriers to external reviews of 
source code and computer systems, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  (footnotes omitted)). 
